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Abstract
We study the structural complexity of bimatrix games, formalized via rank, from an empiri-
cal perspective. We consider a setting where we have data on player behavior in diverse strategic
situations, but where we do not observe the relevant payoff functions. We prove that high com-
plexity (high rank) has empirical consequences when arbitrary data is considered. Additionally,
we prove that, in more restrictive classes of data (termed laminar), any observation is rational-
izable using a low-rank game: specifically a zero-sum game. Hence complexity as a structural
property of a game is not always testable. Finally, we prove a general result connecting the
structure of the feasible data sets with the highest rank that may be needed to rationalize a set
of observations.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the “structural” complexity of bimatrix games from an empirical perspective.
That is, we assume that we have data on players’ behavior (choices) within a game-theoretic
environment, but are ignorant of their payoffs; and we seek to understand whether the data can
be explained via games with “simple” structure or whether the data implies that the games have
“complex” structure, where we take the rank of a game as a measure of its structural complexity.
Thus, we seek to characterize the empirical/testable implications of rank in bimatrix games. Recall
that the rank of a bimatrix game is the rank of the sum of the payoff matrices of the two players.
While questions related to the complexity of economic models have been a driving force behind
research at the intersection of computer science and economics, the empirical approach of the
current paper is nonstandard for this literature. In particular, the dominant perspective of work
in this direction has been an algorithmic perspective. Most work has taken the economic model to
be fixed and literal, and then proceeded to ask about the computational demands placed on the
agents by the model. For example, in the case of noncooperative games, when the payoffs are fixed
and given, computing a mixed Nash equilibrium has been shown to be hard [7,10], even for 2-player
games [4].1 In contrast, this work takes an empirical perspective motivated by revealed-preference
theory.
The revealed-preference approach
Revealed-preference theory seeks to understand the empirical implications of economic models:
given data from an observed phenomenon, the task is to understand how generally a model is
applicable (e.g., how large the class of explainable data is) and to determine what instance of
the theory is consistent with the data (e.g., to determine the payoff matrices that are consistent
with the data). The revealed-preference approach has a long tradition in economics, e.g., see
[2, 14,19,20,23,24]. The paper [25] contains an excellent survey.
If one thinks of economics, and game theory, as a positive (predictive) science (and, arguably, the
vast majority of economists do), then the revealed-preference approach is unavoidable. Economists
use game theory to understand the behavior of human players, and of organizations run by human
agents. When observing such behavior, economists do not have access to agents’ payoffs. Thus,
payoffs, and utility functions, are really unobservable theoretical constructs. Payoffs and utilities
do not have an independent empirical meaning. Instead, one must understand which observable
behaviors have corresponding payoffs such that the theory predicts the observed behavior.
Noncooperative games
Our work focuses on revealed-preference theory in the context of noncooperative games. A data
set is a collection of observed choices taken by a set of agents in different strategic situations. We
want to know when there are payoffs for these agents that can explain the data i.e., payoffs such
that the observations are consistent with the theory of Nash equilibrium. More specifically, our
goal is to understand the empirical consequences of the structural complexity of bimatrix games.
We adopt rank as our notion of structural complexity.
1Computing 3-player Nash Equilibria is FIXP-complete [10]; the 2-player case is PPAD-complete [4]. For additional
background, we refer the interested reader to [6] and to [18]
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We adopt the model of observed data from [21] (see also [26]). We restrict ourselves to two-
player games, and assume a grand set of strategies for each player. Each player is then restricted
to a subset of its grand set, and we observe the joint strategy played in this subgame. This is called
the observed choice. A data set is a collection of subgames, together with the observed choice in
each subgame.
This model of observed data is standard in the revealed-preference literature. It is a straightfor-
ward extension of the classical single-player setting studied by [14,19], where the agent is presented
with different sets of alternatives and we observe the alternative chosen in each case. Our model
is also motivated by experimental economics. For example, [3] describes experiments where treat-
ments differ in the set of strategies available to the players. A typical example is the difference
between the ultimatum and dictatorship games; another example is [5], who look at guessing games
and vary the set of possible guesses subjects can make.
A data set is rationalizable if there exist payoff matrices such that the observed choices are
strict and pure Nash equilibrium in the corresponding subgames. We adopt strict Nash as a natural
discipline for avoiding trivial rationalizations. Without such a discipline, all observed choices can
be rationalized by setting all payoff values for the players to be zero. We focus on pure Nash
following the literature in economics on revealed-preference theory [12, 16, 21]. There are other
solution concepts where revealed-preference theory is relevant, and we discuss some of these in the
conclusion.
The rank of the sum of the payoff matrices is our measure of the structural complexity of
the rationalization. A paradigmatic notion of a simple game is the class of rank-zero games,
which are simply zero-sum games. Zero-sum games are clearly simple: they are easy to analyze
using linear programming; their equilibria are easy to find; and player behavior has an intuitively
simple heuristic: min-max. More generally, games with small rank are also intuitively simple.
For example, rank-one games have a particularly nice interpretation: these correspond to games
where the welfare generated is simply the product of the marginal welfare generated by the actions
of the players. Further, games with low rank are structurally simple since a matrix of rank-k
can be decomposed into k rank-one matrices. Our measure thus captures this intuitive notion of
simplicity in bimatrix games. The rank of a game also has implications for the computation of
mixed Nash equilibria. Mixed Nash equilibria in zero-sum games and rank-one games can be found
in polynomial time [1,17], while in rank-k games, for fixed k, ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria can be
found in time poly(1/ǫ) [15]. Hence, rank is an important concept for varied notions of complexity.
Contributions of this paper
Said succinctly, the goal of this paper is to characterize the empirical implications of rank in bimatrix
games. That is, to understand whether data can always be explained via low-rank (simple) games
or whether high-rank (complex) games are necessary. It is a priori possible that, while highly
complex games are relevant theoretically, they are not needed empirically.
We prove four main results that shed light on the empirical implications of rank in bimatrix
games. We first establish that there exist data sets that cannot be rationalized using low-rank
games (Theorem 1). Specifically, a data set over n strategies may require a rationalizing game to
have rank Ω(
√
n). Consequently, the notion of structural complexity studied here has empirical
consequences: it is testable, i.e, refutable via data. This conclusion is in contrast with other models
in economics: [9] prove that (computational) complexity has no empirical consequences for the
model of individual consumer choice. Our result highlights that their conclusion does not hold for
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the standard noncooperative model, at least when we interpret complexity as low rank.
In order to refine the conclusion of the first result, our second and third results focus on two
cases in which the structure of the observed data is restricted. In our second result, Theorem 2,
we prove that if all observations have the players facing the same set of strategies, then the data
can be rationalizable as a simple game, specifically a rank-one game. Similarly, in our third result,
Theorem 3, we again consider a restricted class of data sets in which each set of alternatives has a
single observation and different sets are either disjoint or nested, i.e., they have a laminar structure.
We prove that, in this case, the data is always rationalizable using a zero-sum game. Thus, for this
(restrictive) family of data sets, structural complexity (rank) again lacks empirical bite: any data
set can be rationalized using the simplest family of games, zero-sum games.
Note that, though restrictive, the classes of data sets studied in the results discussed above are
relevant for typical designs used in experimental economics. In particular, these two classes of data
sets correspond to situations where an experimenter either keeps the same actions available during
repeated plays or successively adds feasible actions for players.
Our final result shows that for arbitrary data sets, the rank needed to rationalize the data is
tied to the degree of nonlaminarity of the sets of alternatives. This generalizes the result for the
laminar case discussed above, which states that laminar data sets can always be rationalized with
a zero-rank game. We prove that if the crossing span (see Definition 2) is k, then the rank needed
to rationalize the observations is at most k. Thus, a data set can refute the assumption of low rank
only if the data is rich enough, i.e., has a large crossing span.
Our results give new insights into the empirical consequences of low- and high-rank games.
The notion of a high-rank, complex, game does have empirically testable implications, but these
implications depend on being able to observe rich families of data. If data is restricted, for example
contains a laminar family of subgames, then it is not possible to refute the assumption of low rank.
In general, we tie the empirical consequences of rank to the crossing span of the data set.
Relationship to prior work
The revealed-preference approach is well studied in the classical context of consumer choice the-
ory (see the large literature started by [2, 14, 19], and the discussion of revealed preference and
complexity in [8], based on [9]).
There is much less work in the context of noncooperative games. The framework we use in this
paper is adopted from [21], which first studied revealed-preference theory in this context. Though
we use the same setting as [21], our work differs in an important sense. Sprumont requires that
one observes choices from all possible subsets of strategies. In particular, he needs choices from
subsets where all players but one are restricted to a single feasible alternative. From such observa-
tions, Sprumont infers a single-agent’s complete revealed-preference graph, and then construct each
agent’s payoffs. Our work relaxes this assumption. We consider scenarios where not all possible
sets of strategies are presented to the agents. The resulting revealed-preference graph will not be
perfectly informative about agents’ payoffs.
More recently, there are two other papers that study noncooperative games via the revealed-
preference approach, [12,16]. Like us, [12] does not require observed choices in all possible subgames.
In [12], the problem of deciding if a data set is rationalizable by a game where the observations are
the only Nash equilibria is proven to be NP-hard. Our results imply that this hardness only arises
when the sets of strategies are non-laminar. More related to our work is [16], which also studies
zero-sum games from the revealed-preference perspective. However, [16] has the same restrictions
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as [21], i.e., all possible subsets of strategies are observed. In this setup, [16] proves that zero-sum
has a very particular empirical implication (on top of the ones imposed by Nash rationalizability):
the well-known property of exchangeability of Nash equilibria of zero-sum games. Our results differ
from those in [16] in that we do not require all subsets of strategies to be observable, and that we
study low-rank games that are not necessarily zero-sum.
2 Preliminaries
Two player normal form games
In this paper we study two-player games in normal form. A two-player game in normal form is
given by a pair of matrices (A,B) of size n × n, which are termed the payoff matrices for the
players. The first player, also called the row player, has payoff matrix A, and the second player, or
the column player, has payoff matrix B. The strategy set for each player is [n]. In this standard
setup, if the row player plays strategy i and column player plays strategy j, then the payoffs of
the two players are Aij and Bij respectively. A pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile of the
players (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n] such that for all i′, j′ ∈ [n], Aij ≥ Ai′j and Bij ≥ Bij′ . If these inequalities
are strict, then (i, j) is said to be a strict Nash equilibrium.
Our focus is on games with low rank, where the rank of a game is the rank of the matrix
C := A+B. For a zero-sum game, C = 0.
Additionally, we often consider subgames of a game, which correspond to restrictions on the
strategies available to the players. A subgame is denoted by (I, J) where I, J ⊆ [n] and I and J
are the strategies available to the row and column player respectively.
Observable data and the revealed preference question
The core of the revealed preference approach is the definition of the data that is observable. In
this paper, we adopt the treatment of [21] and we observe the strategies chosen by the two players
during a sequence of subgames. No other information about the payoff matrices is observed.
Specifically, a data set consists of a set of triples T = {((i, j), I, J)}i,j,I,J where (I, J) is a
subgame, and i ∈ I and j ∈ J . Each such triple is called an observation. A triple ((i, j), I, J)
denotes that in the subgame (I, J), the row player picked strategy i and column player picked j.
The strategy profile (i, j) is called the observed choice in the observation.
Given this data, the revealed preference question is to determine for which data sets T there
exist payoff matrices A and B such that (i, j) is a pure and strict Nash equilibrium in the subgame
(I, J) for all triples ((i, j), I, J) ∈ T . More formally, we say that a data set T is rationalizable if there
exist such payoff matrices. Without the discipline of strictness in the definition of rationalizability,
data could always be rationalized via trivial games.
It is important to remark at this point that not all data sets are rationalizable. For example
Figure 1 depicts a data set that is rationalizable, and another that is not. Figure 1a depicts the
data set T = {((1, 1), {1, 2}, {1, 2}), ((2, 2), {1, 2}, {1, 2})}, rationalizable via
A =
[
2 7
1 8
]
and B =
[
2 1
7 8
]
. (1)
It is easy to verify that the equilibria are exactly those in the given data set.
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(a) Data set that is rationalizable
(via a rank one game).
X
X
(b) Data set that is not rationalizable.
Figure 1: Examples of a rationalizable data set and a data set that is not rationalizable.
In contrast, for a simple example of a game that is not rationalizable consider the data set
T ′ = {((1, 1), [2], [2]), ((2, 1), [2], {2})} shown in Figure 1b. Since all equilibria must be strict, by
the first observation, the entry corresponding to the observed equilibria must dominate the entry
above it in the row player’s payoff matrix. By the second observation, the exact opposite must also
be true, which is impossible.
In this paper our goal is not to characterize data sets that are rationalizable. Rather, our goal is
to characterize data sets that are rationalizable with low-rank bimatrix games, where we use rank
as a notion of the structural complexity of the game.
To illustrate the empirical implications of rank briefly, consider again the rationalizable data
set in Figure 1a and the rationalizing payoff matrices in (1). It is easy to verify that the matrix
C has rank one. In fact, this is the lowest rank rationalization possible for this data set. To see
that no rank-zero game rationalizes this data set, observe that since the diagonal entries are strict
equilibria, each off-diagonal payoff in A must be dominated by the diagonal payoff in the same
column, and each off-diagonal payoff in B must be dominated by the diagonal payoff in the same
row. Then the sum of the diagonal entries in C must strictly dominate the sum of the off-diagonal
entries, which is impossible in a zero-sum game.
Structural properties of data sets
The previous example highlights the interaction of the structure of data sets with the rank of
rationalizing games. The results in this paper focus on exactly this interaction.
In particular, our results depend on the intersections between subgames in the given data
set. Formally, we say that two subgames (I, J) and (I ′, J ′) cross if (I × J) ∩ (I ′ × J ′) 6= ∅, but
(I × J) 6⊆ (I ′ × J ′) and (I ′ × J ′) 6⊆ (I × J). It turns out that when data sets do not contain such
crossings, they are in some sense “simple.” which motivates the consideration of laminarity.
Definition 1. A data set T is laminar if no two subgames in T cross.
For more complex data sets that are not laminar, we define the crossing set as the set of all
subgames in T that cross some subgame in T . Our next definition is useful in obtaining bounds on
the rank of game that rationalizes a non-laminar data set. Let OC be the set of observed choices
for subgames in the crossing set.
Definition 2. For a data set, the crossing span is the minimum of the number of rows and
columns spanned by OC : min {|{i | (i, j) ∈ OC}| , |{j | (i, j) ∈ OC}|} .
The crossing span is a natural formalization of the “richness” of a data set. To illustrate the
definitions above, Figure 2 shows a laminar family of subgames, a family where two subgames cross,
and a data set (including observed choices) where the crossing span is one.
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(a) A laminar family (b) A family where two sub-
games cross
X
X
(c) A family with crossing
spans of the row player, col-
umn player, and game of 2, 1,
and 1
Figure 2: Laminar and crossing families of data sets
In addition to the structural complexity of the data set, the existence of multiple equilibria in a
single subgame can influence rank. In fact, there exist (see Section 4) data sets that are structurally
simple (consist of laminar subgames) but can only be rationalized by high-rank games. Therefore,
structural simplicity by itself does not guarantee low-rank rationalizations. The additional con-
straint on data sets that suffices to establish existence of low-rank games is the following: each
subgame in the data set contains a unique equilibrium. Formally, we define uniqueness as follows:
Definition 3. A rationalizable data set T satisfies the uniqueness property if for any subgame
(I, J) in T there is exactly one observed choice (i, j). Further, if ((i, j), I, J), ((i′ , j′), I ′, J ′) ∈ T
such that I ′ × J ′ ⊆ I × J and (i, j) ∈ I ′ × J ′ then (i′, j′) = (i, j).
3 Results and Discussion
The goal of this paper is to test the empirical implications of rank in bimatrix games. Toward that
end, our first result highlights that the assumption of low rank has empirical bite. More specifically,
the assumption of low rank is refutable via data, i.e., there exist data sets that are rationalizable
only via high-rank games.
Theorem 1. For all n, there exists a rationalizable data set T over an n × n strategy space such
that the rank of any bimatrix game that rationalizes T is Ω(
√
n).
Theorem 1 highlights that complexity in the structure of the observed data can manifest in
requirements on the rationalizing game. This is in contrast to the case of consumer choice theory,
where [9] has shown that whenever observed choice behavior is rationalizable, it is rationalizable
via an easily-optimizable utility function. The proof of Theorem 1 in Section 4 exhibits a family of
data sets that require high rank rationalizations. The family of data sets used is constructed from
Hadamard matrices (introduced in [22]), and the Ω(
√
n) bound is a consequence of the best known
lower bound on the min-rank of Hadamard matrices,
√
n [13].
Theorem 1 highlights that there exist data sets with structure that require high-rank rational-
izing games, and thus motivates the study of data sets with more structure in order to understand
when rationalizing games with low rank are possible. In the following we present theorems char-
acterizing classes of data sets that allow low-rank rationalizations. Though simple, the classes of
data we consider are natural and relevant for typical experimental designs in economics.
First, we focus on the case when the observed data does not involve subgames, i.e., the observed
data consists of repeated observations of choices given fixed strategic options for the players. In
this case, we prove that a rank-one rationalization is always possible, regardless of the number of
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observations in the data. As shown by Figure 1a, zero-sum rationalizations are not always feasible
for such data sets, and so this result is tight.
Theorem 2. For every rationalizable data set of the form T = {((i, j), [n], [n])}i,j there exists a
rationalizing rank-one bimatrix game.
In contrast to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 shows that the assumption of low rank does not have
empirical bite for this class of data sets. So, the data is not “rich” enough to reject low-rank
without also rejecting rationality. Thus, for this class of data, the message is similar to that of [9]
for consumer choice theory. The proof of Theorem 2, given in Section 5, proceeds by constructing
explicit payoffs for the players that are maximized at the given observations. The observations thus
correspond to strict equilibria in the game. The sum of the payoffs can be described by the outer
product of two vectors, and hence the game is of rank one. Importantly, the construction ensures
that the subgame equilibria in the rank-one rationalization are exactly the observations in the data
set, so the simplicity of the game is not a result of adding equilibria that were not observed.
Our remaining results move away from assumption of fixed strategic choices for the players, and
again consider data coming from observations of choices when playing subgames. In this context,
we make two assumptions about the data sets that serve to simplify their structure and guarantee
low-rank rationalizations are possible: (i) we assume that the data set satisfies the uniqueness
property; and (ii) the observed subgames are laminar. These two assumptions are motivated by
the construction of the proof of Theorem 1, which highlights that high-rank rationalizations require
cyclic “revealed preferences” that can result from overlapping subgames with multiple observations.
Given these two assumptions about the data set, we prove that the data can be rationalized as a
zero-sum game.
Theorem 3. If a data set is laminar and satisfies the uniqueness property then it can be rationalized
by a zero-sum game.
Like the case of Theorem 2, Theorem 3 states that the assumption of low rank has no empirical
bite if the data has a simple structure, i.e., laminar subgames with one observation per subgame.
Zero-sum games are arguably the most intuitive and simple noncooperative games, and it is re-
markable that laminar data sets with the uniqueness property, which can conceivably possess a rich
structure, can be rationalized by zero-sum games. Our result hence shows that the NP-hardness
in the result of [12] can be traced to non-laminar sets of alternatives. The proof of Theorem 3
in Section 6 is based on revealed-preference graphs: graphs which capture the inequalities that
must exist between payoffs for the observed data to be rationalizable. These graphs are a natural
component of revealed-preference analysis. In our case, acyclicity of the revealed-preference graph
exactly corresponds to rationalizability by zero-sum games. We prove that the revealed-preference
graph constructed from laminar data sets with one observation per subgame are necessarily acyclic.
Hence the data set is rationalizable by a zero-sum game. As in the case of Theorem 2, structural
simplicity is not a result of the rationalization having subgame equilibria that were not observed.
The identification of laminarity as a structural property ensures that rationalization via zero-
sum games motivates the study of data sets that are “nearly laminar”. One would hope that
“near laminarity” would lead to rationalization via low-rank games, and this is indeed the case. In
particular, the following theorem highlights that a data set is rationalizable via a game having low
rank when the crossing span of the subgames in the data set is small.
Theorem 4. Any rationalizable data set T that satisfies the uniqueness property can be rationalized
by a bimatrix game of rank at most the crossing span of T .
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Theorem 4 provides insight into the connection between the “richness” of the observed data
(formalized via the crossing span) and the “structural complexity” of rationalizing games (formal-
ized via the rank). In particular, it highlights that the empirical bite of the assumption of low rank
is determined by the crossing span of the data. That is, data can be used to refute the assumption
of low rank when the number of observed subgames that cross each other is high enough. The ex-
ample we construct using Hadamard matrices for the proof of Theorem 1 has crossing span Θ(n),
while in the laminar case of Theorem 3, the crossing span is zero2. Thus, Theorem 4 yields an O(n)
upper bound on the rank of the examples used in the proof of Theorem 1. The gap between this
upper bound and the Ω(
√
n) lower bound in Theorem 1 corresponds to the gap between the best
known bounds on the rank of Hadamard matrices [13].
Theorem 4 is proven in Section 7. The proof proceeds through revealed-preference graphs,
similar the proof of Theorem 3. However the intersections in the data set now introduce cycles in
the graph. We break the cycles by introducing additional vertices in the graph. The number of
additional vertices is an upper bound on the rank required for rationalizing the data set, and is
closely related to the crossing span. Note that, unlike Theorems 2 and 3, the construction does
not ensure uniqueness of equilibria in the subgames. This is because, even if the data set satisfies
uniqueness, if it is not laminar there may be no rationalizing game with unique equilibria in every
subgame (see Figure 4).
4 Proof of Theorem 1
Our proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by explicitly constructing data sets that are rationalizable only
by games of rank Ω(
√
n). In particular, we construct two such data sets. These two data sets
are structurally similar, i.e., they enforce the same set of constraints on the payoffs of the players;
however, the data sets have different structural properties. One of these data sets is laminar
and includes two observations for every subgame in the data set. The other data set has many
intersections among the observations, but satisfies the uniqueness property. Thus, we prove that
both non-laminarity and non-uniqueness of equilibria are sufficient individually to enforce high rank
of the rationalizing game.
Throughout, we assume without loss of generality that n is a power of 2. We start by construct-
ing a laminar data set where any rationalizing game has rank Ω(
√
n), proving Theorem 1. Then,
we show how the same lower bound can be obtained by a data set that satisfies the uniqueness
property but has intersections between subgames.
4.1 High Rank in Laminar Data Sets
We start by defining a particular class of data sets used in our construction.
Definition 4. A data set T on an n× n game is 2-regular if:
1. Subgame (A′, B′) appears in T iff A′ = {2i− 1, 2i} and B′ = {2j − 1, 2j} for i, j ∈ [n/2];
2. For each subgame ({2i−1, 2i}, {2j−1, 2j}), either ((2i−1, 2j−1), {2i−1, 2i}, {2j−1, 2j}) ∈ T
and ((2i, 2j), {2i − 1, 2i}, {2j − 1, 2j}) ∈ T , or ((2i− 1, 2j), {2i − 1, 2i}, {2j − 1, 2j}) ∈ T and
((2i, 2j − 1), {2i − 1, 2i}, {2j − 1, 2j}) ∈ T , but not both.
2Note that, Theorem 3 is stronger than Theorem 4 for laminar data sets; since it guarantees rationalizability by
a game in which the observed choices are the only equilibria.
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Figure 3: Example of a two-regular data set.
Two-regular data sets have a very intuitive graphical representation, and one such data set is
illustrated in Figure 3. Each 2× 2 subgame with contiguous rows and columns that starts on even
row and column indices appears exactly twice in the data set. The two entries for each subgame
correspond to either the diagonal elements of the subgame, or the off-diagonal elements.
Next, we associate a sign-pattern matrix with a 2-regular data set. If the data set is in a game of
size n×n, the associated sign-pattern matrix is of size n/2×n/2, and is obtained by replacing each
subgame by +1 or -1 depending on whether the entries in the data set for the subgame correspond
to diagonal or off-diagonal entries. Thus, for the subgame ({2i− 1, 2i}, {2j − 1, 2j}),
1. If (2i − 1, 2j − 1) and (2i, 2j) are the observed choices, replace the subgame by +1.
2. If (2i, 2j − 1) and (2i− 1, 2j) are the observed choices, replace the subgame by -1.
For example, the sign-pattern matrix for the example game in Figure 3 is
[
+1 +1
+1 −1
]
.
The key idea behind our analysis is a correspondence between the sign-pattern matrices de-
scribed above and Hadamard matrices [13, 22], which are square matrices in which every entry is
either +1 or −1 and whose rows are mutually orthogonal. For example, a Hadamard matrix of
order 2 is
H2 =
[
+1 +1
+1 −1
]
.
The sign-pattern matrix for the 2-regular bimatrix game in Figure 3 is exactly H2. We focus on
Hadamard matrices with order 2k, k ∈ Z+ since we assume n is a power of 2. Given a Hadamard
matrix of order 2k−1, a Hadamard matrix of order 2k is
H2k =
[
H2k−1 H2k−1
H2k−1 −H2k−1
]
.
Themin-rank of a Hadamard matrix of order n is the minimum rank over all matrices X ∈ Rn×n
with sign(X) = Hn, where sign(A) for any matrix is obtained by replacing each entry aij by
sign(aij) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. A crucial result for our analysis is:
Proposition 1 ( [11,13]). The min-rank of Hn is at least
√
n.
Given the above proposition, the key lemma we use to establish Theorem 1 is the following,
which shows that for 2-regular data sets where the sign-pattern matrix corresponds to a Hadamard
matrix, the rank of any game that rationalizes the data set is Ω(
√
n).
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Lemma 1. Let T be a 2-regular data set for which the sign-pattern matrix is Hn. Let (A,B) be
any game that rationalizes T , and C = A+B. Then rank(C) ≥ √n.
From Lemma 1 it is straightforward to complete the proof of Theorem 1. In particular, we can
select observations as diagonal or off-diagonal entries in all the subgames of a 2-regular data set T
such that the sign pattern matches Hn. Then the rank of any game that rationalizes T is Ω(
√
n).
Proof of Lemma 1. Define matrix Pn of size n/2 × n as follows: the ith row consists of all zeroes,
except for +1 in position 2i− 1 and -1 in position 2i. Thus,
P4 =
[
+1 −1 0 0
0 0 +1 −1
]
.
It is known that for any matrices X, Y , rank(XY ) ≤ min{rank(X), rank(Y )}. We will show that
rank(PnCP
T
n ) ≥
√
n. The lemma then follows immediately.
The key step in the argument is the following claim.
Claim 1. For a 2×2 bimatrix game (A′, B′), if the equilibria are exactly the diagonal elements, then
P2C
′P T2 > 0. Conversely, if the equilibria are exactly the off-diagonal elements, then P2C
′P T2 < 0.
To prove the claim, let us consider the first part first. Since the diagonal elements are equilibria,
a′11 > a
′
21 and b
′
11 > b
′
12, along with, a
′
22 > a
′
12 and b
′
22 > b
′
21.
Adding up these inequalities yields a′11+b
′
11+a
′
22+b
′
22 > a
′
21+b
′
12+a
′
12+b
′
21, or c
′
11+c
′
22 > c
′
12+c
′
21.
Since P2C
′P T2 = c
′
11 + c
′
22 − c′12 − c′21, the first part of the claim follows. The second part of the
claim is easily seen by reversing each of the previous inequalities.
Proceeding with the proof of Lemma 1, let L := PnCP
T
n . Then L has size n/2 × n/2, and
Lij = C2i−1,2i−1+C2j,2j −C2i−1,2j −C2i,2j−1. Since (A,B) rationalizes the data set, for each 2× 2
subgame that corresponds to subgames in the data set, the equilibria is either on the diagonal
elements, or on the off-diagonal elements. By Claim 1, in the first case, Li,j > 0, and in the second
case, Li,j < 0.
Let S be the sign-pattern matrix obtained for the given data set; by the statement of the
theorem, S = Hn. Then it follows by the construction of S that Sij > 0 ⇒ Lij > 0, and
Sij < 0 ⇒ Lij < 0. Thus, S = sign(L), and hence sign(L) = Hn. Then by Proposition 1,
rank(PnCP
T
n ) = rank(L) = rank(Hn) ≥
√
n.
4.2 High Rank in Data Sets with Uniqueness
The previous construction gives a data set requiring high-rank rationalization that is laminar, but
does not satisfy uniqueness. We now show how to modify the laminar data set T to obtain a data
set T ′ that satisfies uniqueness, but has many intersecting subgames.
Let T be a 2-regular data set with sign-pattern matrix Hn. The modification to obtain T
′ is
based on the following observation. Each pair of observations corresponding to a subgame in the
original data set can be replaced by three observations, as shown in Figure 4.
This gives us our data set T ′. Note that we replace two observations that do not satisfy
uniqueness with intersecting subgames. However, the subgames introduced satisfy the uniqueness
property. Thus, the data set T ′ is no longer laminar, but does satisfy uniqueness. The subgames
are constructed to capture the same requirements on payoffs as were induced by the observations
with multiplicity of equilibria.
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(a) The diagonal case.
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(b) The off-diagonal case.
Figure 4: Constructing a data set that satisfies uniqueness. In each of the two cases, the two
observations on the left are replaced by the three observations on the right.
The proof that every rationalization of T ′ has rank Ω(
√
n) is very similar to the proof for data
set T . In particular, we can establish the following claim, corresponding to Claim 1.
Claim 2. If the 2×2 bimatrix game (A′, B′) rationalizes the observations on the right in Figure 4a,
then P2C
′P T2 > 0. Conversely, if (A
′, B′) rationalizes the observations on the right in Figure 4b,
then P2C
′P T2 < 0.
The proof of the claim is obtained by observing that the inequalities in Claim 1 continue to
hold under the modified conditions in Claim 2. The rest of the proof that any rationalizing game
for T ′ has rank Ω(
√
n), is exactly the same as in the case of T .
5 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 considers data of the form T = {((i, j), [n], [n])}i,j , which implies that in all the obser-
vations the players were free to choose any strategy. In this section, we prove that whenever data
of this form is rationalizable, it is rationalizable with a rank one game. For ease of notation we
simply write the observed set T as {(i, j)}i,j .
To begin the proof, note that if T is rationalizable then, by definition, there exists a bimatrix
game, say (A′, B′), such that every (i, j) ∈ T is a strict Nash equilibrium in (A′, B′). In other
words, for any (i, j) ∈ T , we have Aij > Akj for all k 6= i and Bij > Bik for all k 6= j. Therefore all
distinct tuples (i, j) and (i′, j′) in T are in fact component-wise distinct: i 6= i′ and j 6= j′.
Say we have ℓ observations over an n × n strategy space, |T | = ℓ; below we construct a n × n
rank-1 bimatrix game (A,B) in which (i, i) is a strict Nash equilibrium for all i ∈ [ℓ] and no other
strategy profile is an equilibrium. Then we can permute the rows of A and B (i.e., relabel strategies)
and their columns to get a rank-1 game that rationalizes T .
The construction is as follows. Set Aij = 2ij− i2+ j2 and Bij = 2ij+ i2− j2 if i ∈ [ℓ] or j ∈ [ℓ].
In addition, set Aij = 0 and Bij = 4ij for all i, j ∈ {ℓ+1, ℓ+2, . . . , n}. Note that the (i, j)th entry
of matrix A+B is 4ij, hence the game is of rank 1.
For all i ≤ ℓ, the largest term in the ith column (row) of matrix A (B) is on the diagonal.
Hence, all the strategy profiles in {(i, i) | i ∈ [ℓ]} are strict Nash equilibrium. Note that for all
strategy profiles (i, j) ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . , n} × {ℓ + 1, . . . , n} the row player has a benefiting deviation,
implying that none of them can be an equilibrium. In particular, for any such strategy profile we
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have A1j > Aij (since, A1j = 2j − 1 + j2 and Aij = 0). Thus the set of Nash equilibrium for the
game is exactly {(i, i) | i ∈ [ℓ]}.
6 Proof of Theorem 3
In this section we prove that if a data set satisfies laminarity and uniqueness, then it can be
rationalized by a zero-sum game. Additionally, every observed subgame in the constructed zero-
sum game has a unique equilibrium, corresponding to the observed choices.
Our proof depends on graphs constructed on the payoffs of the row player, called revealed-
preference graphs. In a zero-sum game, the payoffs of the row player determine the payoffs of the
column player, hence it is sufficient to focus on the payoffs of the row player. Revealed-preference
graphs are graphical depictions of the relations that must exist between the payoffs in order for the
data set to be rationalizable.
Definition 5. A directed graph G = (V,E) is a revealed-preference graph if there is a bijection
σ : V → [n] × [n] so that for every e = (v,w) ∈ E, σ(v) and σ(w) have exactly one identical
coordinate.
G is a directed graph, hence edge e = (v,w) is directed from vertex v to vertex w. Corre-
spondence σ identifies the vertices of the revealed-preference graph, hence, with a slight abuse of
notation, we will use (i, j) to denote both strategy profiles and vertices. If an edge goes between
row entries: e = ((i, j), (i′, j)), then it is called a row edge. If e = ((i, j), (i, j′)), edge e is a column
edge. By definition, every edge in a revealed-preference graph must be either a row edge or a
column edge.
Definition 6. A revealed-preference graph G implements an observation ((i, j),X, Y ) in a data
set T if E contains the following edges:
1. Edges ((i, j), (i′, j)) for each i′ ∈ X \ {i}.
2. Edges ((i, j′), (i, j)) for each j′ ∈ Y \ {j}.
Further, G strongly implements observation ((i, j),X, Y ) ∈ T if G implements the observation
and every vertex (i′, j′) 6= (i, j) ∈ X × Y either has a row edge from a vertex in X × Y , or has a
column edge to a vertex in X × Y .
We say G (strongly) implements a data set T if it (strongly) implements every observation in
T . Revealed-preference graphs are useful because of the following implications on the data set they
implement.
Lemma 2. If revealed-preference graph G implements data set T and is acyclic, then the data set
can be rationalized by a zero-sum game.
Proof. We explicitly construct the payoff matrices A,−A for the row and column players and show
that these rationalize the data set. Since G is acyclic, it has a topological ordering. A topological
ordering naturally corresponds to a partial ordering, and we use this correspondence to choose the
entries in A. Start with l = 1, where l is the length traversed so far in the ordering. For every
vertex (i, j) with no outgoing edge, set Aij = l. Remove these vertices and the incoming edges for
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these vertices, increment l by 1, and recurse. It is easy to see that by this construction, if there is
a path from (i, j) to (i′, j′), then Aij > Ai′j′ . Fill the remaining entries in A arbitrarily.
We now show that the game (A,−A) rationalizes T . SinceG implements T , for every observation
((i, j),X, Y ) ∈ T , G contains an edge from (i, j) to each vertex (i′, j) for i′ ∈ X \ {i}. Then
Aij > Aij′ by construction, and hence if the column player plays j, the best response available to
the row player in the subgame (X,Y ) is i. Similarly, G contains an edge from each vertex (i, j′) for
j′ ∈ Y \ {j} to (i, j). Then Aij′ > Aij, or −Aij > −Aij′ . Thus if the row player plays i, the best
response available to the column player in the subgame (X,Y ) is j. Thus i and j are best responses,
and (i, j) must be an equilibrium in the subgame (X,Y ). This is true for every observation, and
hence (A,−A) is zero sum and rationalizes data set T .
Corollary 1. If G strongly implements T and is acyclic, then T can be rationalized by a zero-sum
game with the additional property that every subgame in T has a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Since G is acyclic and implements T , we can construct (A,−A) that rationalizes T . Since T
satisfies uniqueness, every subgame (X,Y ) in T has a unique observed choice. We will additionally
show that for every subgame (X,Y ) in T if (i′, j′) is not this observed choice, then (i′, j′) is not an
equilibrium in the subgame (X,Y ). This proves uniqueness.
If (i′, j′) is not the unique observed choice for subgame (X,Y ) that appears in T , by definition
of strong implementation, the vertex (i′, j′) either has a row edge from a vertex (v, j′) in X ×Y , or
has column edge to a vertex (i′, w) in X×Y . In the first case, by the construction of A, Ai′j′ < Avj′
and the row player has an improving deviation to strategy v. In the second case, −Ai′j′ < −Ai′w
and the column player has an improving deviation to strategy w. In either case, (i′, j′) is not an
equilibrium.
If data set T includes an observation for the entire game ([n], [n]), Corollary 1 holds for this
observation as well, and there is a unique equilibrium in the game ([n], [n]).
If T is laminar and satisfies uniqueness, we will construct a revealed-preference graph that
strongly implements T and is acyclic. By Corollary 1, T must then be rationalizable by a zero-sum
game, and every subgame observed in T has a unique equilibrium in this game. We assume that
no two observations in T have exactly the same observed choice. This is without loss of generality,
since if O1 = ((i, j),X, Y ) ∈ T and O2 = ((i, j),X ′ , Y ′) ∈ T have the same observed choice (i, j),
then (by laminarity) one of X × Y , X ′ × Y ′ must contain the other. We remove the observation
corresponding to the smaller subgame to obtain data set T ′. Then any game that rationalizes T ′
must also rationalize T , and if (i, j) is the unique equilibrium in the larger subgame, it is also the
unique equilibrium in the smaller subgame.
Any laminar family of sets has a natural representation as a tree3, where every set corresponds
to a vertex. Vertex v corresponding to set R is a child of w corresponding to set S if R ⊂ S, and
no set Q in the family satisfies R ⊂ Q ⊂ S. If two vertices in this tree are not on the same path
to the root, the corresponding sets are disjoint. Thus, sets corresponding to leaves in the tree are
disjoint, and do not contain any other sets.
Let T be the tree obtained as described above for the subgames in T . For a subgame (X,Y )
corresponding to vertex v in T , we use Γ(X,Y ) to denote the subgames corresponding to children
3Technically we obtain a forest. However the distinction is unimportant in this case, and for simplicity we assume
we obtain a tree
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A11 A12
A21 A22
A13
A23
A31 A32 A33
(1, 1)
(a) A revealed-preference graph that strongly
implements the observation ((1,1),[3],[3]).
S
S1
S0
S2
S3
ΓR(S) = {S0, S1}
ΓC(S) = {S2, S3}
(1, 1)
(b) Revealed-preference graph for subgame S.
Figure 5: Revealed-preference graphs
of v. Our construction of G = (V,E) is inductive on the height of T . Let V = [n]× [n], where n is
the size of the game for the data set T .
In the base case, the height of T is 1, and hence the data set consists of disjoint subgames
and a single observation for each subgame. We describe the construction for a single observation
((i, j),X, Y ). Assume without loss of generality that (i, j) = (1, 1). Add edges in G as described in
Definition 6 so that G implements T . For strong implementation, we add row edges ((1, j′), (i′, j′))
to E for each i′ ∈ X \ {1} and j′ ∈ Y \ {1}. Then every vertex in X × Y that differs from (1, 1)
in both coordinates has a row edge from a vertex in X × Y . Since G implements T , every vertex
in X × Y that differs from (1, 1) in a single coordinate already has either a row edge from (1, 1) or
a column edge to (1, 1). The construction is shown for a single observation in a 3× 3 subgame in
Figure 5a.
Claim 3. The revealed-preference graph constructed in the base case is acyclic.
Proof. In the base case, the sets of vertices in V corresponding to each subgame are disjoint.
Further, by the construction of the revealed-preference graph, every edge has both its vertices in
the same subgame. Thus all the edges in any cycle must correspond to those added for a single
observation. However, for the observation ((i, j),X, Y ) the only vertex that has both incoming and
outgoing edges is (i, j). Hence there cannot be a cycle.
For the inductive step, the height of the tree T is k > 1. We construct G so that it strongly
implements all subgames corresponding to vertices in T at height less than k. By the induction
hypothesis, G is also acyclic. For each observation O = ((i, j),X, Y ) with subgame (X,Y ) at height
k, we add edges to E as follows. As before, we assume without loss of generality that (i, j) = (1, 1).
Add edges in E as described in Definition 6 so that G implements O. Let E1 and E2 denote
the set of edges added to satisfy Properties (1) and (2) in Definition 6 respectively. For strong
implementation, we add the edge sets E3 and E4, described below. In the following discussion, we
use ΓR(X,Y ) to denote the subgames in Γ(X,Y ) that contain row one: ΓR(X,Y ) := {(I ′, J ′) ∈
Γ(X,Y ) | 1 ∈ I ′}. We denote the remaining subgames by ΓC(X,Y ) := Γ(X,Y ) \ ΓR(X,Y ). For
any subgame (X ′, Y ′), define V (X ′, Y ′) := X ′×Y ′. Define VR(X,Y ) :=
⋃
(X′,Y ′)∈ΓR(X,Y )
V (X ′, Y ′)
and VC(X,Y ) :=
⋃
(X′,Y ′)∈ΓC(X,Y )
V (X ′, Y ′). We use VL(X,Y ) to denote the remaining ver-
tices not in the first row or column: VL(X,Y ) := {(i, j) | i 6= 1, j 6= 1 and (i, j) ∈ V (X,Y ) \
VR(X,Y )
⋃
VC(X,Y )}.
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E3 : For every vertex (i, j) ∈ VR(X,Y ), add edge ((i, j), (i, 1)).
E4 : For every vertex (i, j) ∈ VC(X,Y )
⋃
VL(X,Y ), add edge ((1, j), (i, j)).
Let E′ = E1
⋃
E2
⋃
E3
⋃
E4. It is easy to see that the resulting graph strongly implements ob-
servation O = ((i, j),X, Y ). We show now that the resulting graph is also acyclic. The construction
and the proof of Claim 4 is also depicted in Figure 5b.
Claim 4. The graph obtained by the induction step is acyclic.
Proof. We will show that the added edges E′ cannot create any cycles in the revealed-preference
graph. Note that by our assumption, no game in Γ(X,Y ) contains both row 1 and column 1, since
the observed choice for this subgame would be (1, 1) by the uniqueness property of the data set.
This implies that for any vertex (i, j) ∈ VR(X,Y ), j > 1, and hence edges in E3 always go from
a vertex in VR(X,Y ) to a vertex not in VR(X,Y ). Similarly, edges in E4 go from a vertex not in
VC(X,Y ) ∪ VL(X,Y ) to a vertex in VC(X,Y ) ∪ VL(X,Y ). Thus, no two edges are incident on the
same vertex.
We first show that there is no cycle that consists entirely of vertices from a single subgame in
Γ(X,Y ). To see this, note that every edge in E1 and E2 is incident on (1, 1), which is not in any
subgame. Further, edges in E3 go from a vertex in VR(X,Y ) to a vertex not in VR(X,Y ). Similarly,
edges in E4 go from a vertex not in VC(X,Y )∪VL(X,Y ) to a vertex in VC(X,Y )∪VL(X,Y ). Thus
no edge in E′ has both end-points in the same subgame in Γ(X,Y ), and hence E′ cannot create
cycles contained in a single subgame in Γ(X,Y ).
We now show that no cycle can contain any edge that has exactly one incident vertex in a
subgame in Γ(X,Y ). Note that the edges in E \ E′ introduced earlier have both vertices in the
same subgame. Now suppose there is a cycle with such an edge e = (v,w), and the subgame is in
ΓR(X,Y ). Such an edge must be in E2 or E3. However, by the way we add these edges, any edge
in E2 or E3 must start from a vertex in VR(X,Y ). There is no way to complete the cycle, since
no edge in E′ goes to VR(X,Y ). We can similarly show that no edge in a cycle can have exactly
one vertex in ΓC(X,Y ).
Lastly, it is easy to see that no cycle can only consist of vertices in VL(X,Y ). All edges on
these vertices are in E′, and by the construction of E′, (1, 1) is the only such vertex with both an
incoming and an outgoing edge.
The proof of Theorem 3 follows immediately from the inductive construction described above.
Specifically, following the construction gives us a revealed-preference graph that strongly imple-
ments the data set and is acyclic. Thus, from Corollary 1, we can obtain a zero-sum game (A,−A)
that rationalizes T and has a unique equilibrium in every subgame that appears in T .
7 Proof of Theorem 4
In this section we show that the rank of a rationalizing game is governed by the degree of intersection
among subgames in the observed data. In particular, given a rationalizable data set T that satisfies
the uniqueness property we can construct a rationalizing bimatrix game of rank at most the crossing
span of T .
For the proof we extend the revealed-preference graphs from Section 6. If the given data set
is not laminar, then the revealed-preference graph can contain cycles. We remove these cycles by
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u = (a0, b, φ)
(a1, b, R)
e
w = (ar, b, φ)
Figure 6: A hypothetical cycle in the revealed-preference graph
replacing vertices corresponding to observed choices in crossing subgames by two vertices, a row
vertex that is incident only to row edges, and a column vertex that is incident only to column edges.
Definition 7. A directed graph G = (V,E) is a split revealed-preference graph if there is a
set S ⊆ [n]× [n] and a bijection σ : V → A⋃B so that:
1. Sets A = {(i, j, ∅)|(i, j) 6∈ S}, and B = {(i, j, R), (i, j, C)|(i, j) ∈ S}.
2. For every e = (v,w) ∈ E, exactly one of the following statements is true: (a) the first
coordinate of σ(v) and σ(w) are equal, or (b) the second coordinate of σ(v) and σ(w) are
equal. Further, if the second coordinate is equal, this edge is a row edge, and the third
coordinate in both σ(v) and σ(w) is not C. If the first coordinate is identical, this edge is a
column edge, and the third coordinate in both σ(v) and σ(w) is not R.
This definition introduces a set S of split vertices. We identify vertices by their σ value; i.e.,
refer to them as (i, j, ∅), (i, j, R), or (i, j, C). A vertex with R in its third coordinate is called a row
vertex. A vertex with C in its third coordinate is called a column vertex, while a vertex with ∅ as
the third coordinate is called an intact vertex. By the second condition in the definition, no row
edges are incident on column vertices, and no column edges are incident on row vertices. Thus, a
row vertex is never adjacent to a column vertex.
Definition 8. A split revealed-preference graph G implements an observation ((i, j),X, Y ) in a
data set T if E contains the following edges:
1. Edges ((i, j, A), (i′ , j, B)) with A,B ∈ {R, ∅} for each i′ ∈ X \ {i}.
2. Edges ((i, j′, A), (i, j, B)) with A,B ∈ {C, ∅} for each j′ ∈ Y \ {j}.
As before, G implements data set T if it implements every observation in the data set. Crucially,
if E consists of a minimal set of edges that implement a data set T , then the existence of an edge
(v,w) where v = (i, j, A) and w = (i′, j′, B), A,B ∈ {R,C, ∅} implies that for some subgame X×Y ,
both (i, j) ∈ X × Y and (i′, j′) ∈ X × Y .
For a split revealed-preference graph, define the row span := |{i|(i, j, R) ∈ V, j ∈ [n]}|, column
span := |{j|(i, j, C) ∈ V, i ∈ [n]}|; and span of the graph to be the minimum of row and column
span.
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Lemma 3. If split revealed-preference graph G implements data set T and is acyclic, then T is
rationalizable by a game of rank at most the span of G.
Proof. Our proof explicitly constructs payoff matrices A,B for the row and column players and
shows that these rationalize the data set. In our construction, Aij + Bij = 0 if there is an intact
vertex (i, j, ∅) ∈ E. The only strategy profiles (i, j) where Aij+Bij 6= 0 correspond to split vertices.
It follows immediately that the number of linearly independent rows in C = A+B is bounded by
the row span of G, the number of linearly independent columns is bounded by the column span,
and hence the rank of C is at most the span of G.
Since G is acyclic, it has a topological ordering. We traverse V following such an ordering,
starting with vertices that have no outgoing edges. Start with l = 1 where l is the length traversed
so far in the ordering. For every vertex v with no outgoing edge, if v is an intact vertex (i, j, ∅),
Aij = l and Bij = −l. If v = (i, j, R), set Aij = l, else set Bij = −l. Remove these vertices and
the incoming edges for these vertices, increment l by 1, and recurse. Fill in the remaining entries
in A arbitrarily and for these entries set Bij = −Aij. If there is an edge from (i, j) to (i′, j′), then
Aij > Ai′j′, and Bij < Bi′j′ .
We now show that the game (A,B) rationalizes T . Since G implements T , for every observation
((i, j),X, Y ) ∈ T , G contains an edge from (i, j) to each vertex (i′, j) for i′ ∈ X\{i}. ThenAij > Aij′
by construction. Similarly, G contains an edge from each vertex (i, j′) for j′ ∈ Y \ {j} to (i, j).
Then Bij > Bij′ . Thus (i, j) must be an equilibrium in the subgame (X,Y ). This is true for every
observation, hence (A,B) rationalizes data set T .
Unlike the previous section, we cannot guarantee uniqueness of equilibria in the rationalizing
game. Even if a data set satisfies uniqueness, there may be no rationalizing game with unique
equilibria in every subgame. An example of this is shown in Figure 4.
Let S denote the subgames contained in data set T . Let SC be the set of crossing subgames in
T : SC := {S ∈ S | ∃S′ ∈ S such that S and S′ cross} and let SR := S \ SC . Subgames in SR form
a laminar family. Let O be the set of observed choices in T . OC is the set of observed choices for
subgames in SC , and OR := O \ OC .
We now define a split revealed-preference graph from T . Let V and E be as in Definition 8,
so that G = (V,E) implements the data set T . Define EC as the set of edges incident on the split
vertices, and ER = E \ EC .
Claim 5. The graph (V,ER) is acyclic.
Proof. Let T ′ be the set of observations in T over subgames in SR. The revealed-preference graph
defined from T ′, G′ = (V ′, E′) is acyclic and implements T ′. Let ρ((i, j, ∅)) → (i, j) map intact
vertices in V to vertices in V ′. Each edge in ER implements an observation in T
′, since all edges to
implement observations in T \ T ′ are incident on split vertices. As G′ implements T ′, the mapping
ρ must preserve edges: if there is an edge (v,w) in ER, then there is an edge (ρ(v), ρ(w)) in E
′.
Since G′ is acyclic, so is (V,ER).
Claim 6. If T is rationalizable, then no cycle in G consists entirely of row edges or entirely of
column edges.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that T is rationalizable and G has such a cycle K. Let (A,B)
be a game that rationalizes T . Assume that cycle K is entirely on row edges; the case where K is
entirely on column edges can be ruled out similarly. Every vertex in K must have the same second
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coordinate, say j. By definition of revealed-preference graph, there is an edge e = ((i, j), (i′, j)) ∈ K
only if Aij < Ai′j . This is obviously incompatible with the cycle K.
Lemma 4. Let T be rationalizable. The graph G is acyclic and has span exactly equal to the
crossing span of the data set.
Proof. We first prove acyclicity. We will show that if there is a cycle in G, then there is a cycle
containing only edges in ER. This contradicts Claim 5, and hence G must be acyclic. Suppose for
the contradiction that G does contain a cycle K. By Claim 5, K must contain an edge e incident
on a split vertex v. Assume that e is a row edge; the case where e is a column edge can be handled
similarly. Then v must be a row vertex.
By Claim 6, K cannot contain only split vertices, as these would all be on the same row or
column. Let p′ = (v1, . . . , vr−1) be a path that contains v, is part of cycle K, and the vertex u
preceding v1 and w succeding vr−1 in K are intact. Observe that u 6= w by Claim 6.
Let p = (v0 = u, v1, . . . , vr = w) be the path in K between u and w. We claim that v0 has an
edge to each vi in p. Then in particular there is an edge (u,w) that is in ER, and we can remove
split vertex v from cycle K. Continuing in this manner, we will be left with a cycle only on intact
vertices, which contradicts Claim 5.
Let v0 = (a0, b, ∅), vr = (ar, b, ∅), and vi = (ai, b, R) for 1 < i < r. Our proof is by induction
on i. First, the edge (v0, v1) is incoming on vertex v1 and is a row edge; it must correspond to an
observation O = ((a0, b),X, Y ). By construction of the revealed-preference graph, the existence of
edge (v0, v1) implies that v1 = (a1, b) ∈ X × Y .
Now the inductive step. Let (ai−1, b) ∈ X×Y . Edge (vi−1, vi) is incoming on vertex vi so it must
correspond to an observation O = ((ai−1, b),X
′, Y ′). By construction of the revealed-preference
graph, vi = (ai, b) ∈ X ′ × Y ′. Importantly, subgame (X ′, Y ′) does not cross (X,Y ): otherwise the
observation (X,Y ) ∈ SC , and (a0, b) would be a split vertex. Since (ai−1, b) ∈ X×Y ∩X ′×Y ′, either
X × Y ⊂ X ′ × Y ′ or X ′ × Y ′ ⊂ X × Y . The former is ruled out by the uniqueness property since
otherwise there are two observations ((a0, b),X, Y ) and ((ai−1, b),X
′, Y ′) with X × Y ⊂ X ′ × Y ′
and (ai−1, b) ∈ X × Y , but (ai−1, b) 6= (a0, b). Thus, (ai, b) ∈ X × Y , and there is a row edge from
(a0, b) to (ai, b).
For the proof of the span of G, fix (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n]. By the construction of G, there is a split
vertex pair ((i, j, R), (i, j, C) if and only if (i, j) ∈ OC . It follows that the span of G must be exactly
identical to the crossing span of T .
8 Concluding remarks
This paper characterizes the empirical implications of rank in bimatrix games. Our results present
a fairly complete characterization of how the empirical implications of structural complexity (for-
malized via rank) depend on the richness of the observed data (formalized via the crossing span).
In particular, we show that the observed data must have a large enough crossing span in order for
low-rank to be refutable.
The results in the paper motivate a number of interesting directions. For example, there is a
Θ(
√
n) gap between Theorems 1 and 4 due, in part, to the fact that our lower bound depends on
Hadamard matrices, for which the rank is not precisely known.
The study of both mixed Nash and correlated equilibria is of great interest, especially given
recent results on the hardness of computing mixed Nash. However, it is not trivial to model
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observations for either of these solution concepts. Treating observed behavior as a sample of
theoretical mixed choices is not easy to set up conceptually. In fact the literature in economics
has yet to produce results of this case. We believe that our results for pure Nash equilibrium give
insight into these solution concepts as well.
More broadly, the empirical perspective on complexity is under-explored. There exist ini-
tial results for consumer choice theory [9], general equilibrium theory [9], and the theory of non-
cooperative games (this paper). However, each of these areas warrant further study. Additionally,
the empirical approach can shed light on the testable implications of complexity in other economic
theories, such as the theory of stable matchings.
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